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Abstract: In this paper, we examine the concept of particle as it appears
in quantum field theories (QFT), focusing on a puzzling situation regarding
this concept. Although quantum ‘particles’ arise from fields, which form
the basic ontology of QFT, and thus a certain concept of ‘particle’ is al-
ways available, the properties ascribed to such ‘particles’ are not completely
in agreement with the mathematical and logical description of such fields,
which should be taken as individuals.
Keywords: Particles in quantum physics. Indiscernibility of quantum ob-
jects. Ontology of quantum theories.
QUESTO˜ES ONTOLO´GICAS NA TEORIA QUAˆNTICA
Resumo: Neste artigo, examinamos o conceito de part´ıcula tal como ocorre
nas teorias quaˆnticas de campos (QFT), enfocando uma situac¸a˜o enigma´tica
acerca desse conceito. Embora ‘part´ıculas’ quaˆnticas surjam a partir de cam-
pos, que constituem a ontologia ba´sica das QFT, e, assim, certo conceito de
‘part´ıcula’ encontra-se sempre dispon´ıvel, as propriedades atribu´ıdas a tais
‘part´ıculas’ na˜o esta˜o em completo acordo com as descric¸o˜es matema´tica e
lo´gica dos campos em questa˜o, que sa˜o considerados como indiv´ıduos.
Palavras chave: Part´ıculas na f´ısica quaˆntica. Indiscernibilidade de ob-
jetos quaˆnticos. Ontologia das teorias quaˆnticas.
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1 Introduction
“Then what is the ontology of quantum field theory? But what kind of quantum
field theory? Actual or imaginable? [. . .] [E]ven within the category of actually
existing quantum field theory, there are different versions: canonical formalism,
functional formalism and algebraic formalism. Frequently people remind me that I
should be sensitive to the different implications entailed by different formulations
of quantum field theory. But in my opinion, in terms of ontological commitment,
the existing different formulations make no difference at all.”
Tian Y. Cao [2003]
The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) is becoming ready for experiments (see
[14]). There physicists aim to find, among other things, the Higgs boson,
which according to the standard model (SM) of particle physics causes an
interaction that justifies why particles have mass. At the LHC, physicists will
accelerate beams of particles, such as protons, until near the speed of light,
and after copious collisions (interactions), they will analyze their behavior.
If all goes well, the events inside the collider should reproduce energies that
were supposedly present a few moments after the Big Bang. To a certain
extent, the progress of physics depends on finding the relevant features of
elementary particles that have been previously postulated. Of course, new
discoveries may emerge from the new experiments as well.
According to current physics, everything in the universe is made up from
twelve basic fundamental particles (which give raise to approximately 200
particles), governed by four fundamental interacting forces. The standard
model (SM) deals with three of them: electromagnetic, weak, and strong
forces. At this stage, it constitutes our best understanding of how these par-
ticles and the relevant forces are related to each other. However, gravitation
is still out of the picture. It is supposed that gravitation is also connected
to a putative particle, called graviton. Thus, current physical theorizing
at this level is based on the concept of ‘particle’. It is not surprising then
to find those who insist that “[t]he idea of a particle, [although] required
modification with the advent of quantum theory, (. . .) remains central to
scientific explanation” [12]. In this respect, on a realist reading, particles
are the reality of present-day SM.
There is, still, a clear distinction between these particles and ‘classical’
(spatiotemporally characterized) particles. In fact, as they occur in stan-
dard, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the particles of the SM that are
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classified as being ‘of the same type’ are conceptually indiscernible. This
is not the case with classical particles. An interesting foundational prob-
lem then emerges regarding the formal (logical) characterization of these
indiscernible objects.
Strictly speaking, if we consider the mathematical formulation of the
SM, we just find fields. The standard model is a (mathematical) theory of
fields: there are scalar fields, vector fields, tensor fields, spinors fields, and
so on (see [6, p. 24]). In this context, particles are special situations of
fields: they are certain excitations of quantum fields, or, as B. Falkenburg
[8] notes, ‘epiphenomena of fields’. An electron, for instance, is an electron-
field, whereas a proton is a proton-field. Fields are the most basic entities
referred to by the theory, and particles arise out of them. At first glance,
we don’t know what fields (and hence ‘particles’) are, for it depends on
the particular interpretation of the theory, and how it is applied. If the
ontology of a theory comprises the most basic kind of entity that the theory
posits (see Cao [4]), the reduction of the concept of particle to the concept
of field turns the ontology of QFT into an ontology of fields. However, as
we noted, particles still emerge, and cannot be dismissed, at least as far as
the discourse of the physicists is concerned. Michael Redhead [17] said that
even in QFT “a particle grin” remains, yet it may just be an ‘operational’
concept of particle (more on this below).
The subject is controversial. In a recent pre-print, Casey Blood [2]
stressed the fact that there is no evidence for particles in quantum physics.
On his view, “all the particle-like phenomena can be explained by using cer-
tain not-widely-known properties of the wave function/state vector alone”.
By ‘particle-like phenomena’ he understands all properties “which have led
physicists to postulate the existence of particles-mass, energy, momentum,
spin, charge, the photoelectric and Compton effects, localized perception,
particle-like trajectories, and atomic discreteness” which (according to him)
can all be explained “by quantum mechanics alone”, without recourse to
particles. We believe that, as far as current quantum physics (QFT) goes,
he is right. But, of course, his criticisms are directed against the stan-
dard concept of particle, described by classical physics. However, Redhead’s
point still stands: some concept of particle remains (whether such particles
are thought of as ‘epiphenomena of fields’, ‘field excitations’, or whatever).
Clearly, these ‘particles’ are theoretical concepts, motivated by physical intu-
itions. And although from the point of view of QFT, as noted, these particles
can be ‘reduced’ to fields, they are neither like their classical counterparts
nor like the fundamental entities of quantum physics.
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The point can be extended further. After all, even fields may turn out not
to be the very final ontological stuff of physics. For if string theory is correct,
there are more fundamental objects, such as strings and p-branes. In turn, an
algebraic version of QFT advances an approach that incorporates radically
different assumptions. In the end, there does not seem to be a definitive
answer to the question of the ultimate ontology of physics. Auyang [1] once
noted that ontology is concerned “not with what exists as God ordains but
with what exists as intelligible within the bounds of human understanding”.1
At best, we can try to make sense of the ontological commitments of various
physical theories, understanding along the way physicists’ discourse about
such theories — if possible, within a clear logical framework.
Thus, it is important to acknowledge that contemporary physicists deal
with a particle concept (although not with the classical one). This is the
concept we are concerned with. We will speak of protons, neutrinos, elec-
trons, and quarks as they appear in physical theories (albeit as a secondary
species of objects), and we will consider which properties they have, which
logic they obey. Without providing a complete account of these issues, for
it may well be that they cannot be answered in full,2 we focus on the issue
of these particles’ individuality. We argue that there is a discrepancy be-
tween the mathematical treatment of these objects as fields described within
classical mathematics (and logic), and the supposed indiscernibility of the
resulting particles. The tension is circumvented, in standard mathematics,
only by assuming certain ad hoc symmetry conditions, such as the so-called
Indistinguishability Postulate (see [10, passim]). Hence, we suggest that if
these objects have the properties that most interpretations of quantum me-
chanics ascribe to them, there is a clear sense in which we may interpret
them as entities governed by a non-classical logic.
2 Fields and particles
The history of the concept of particle and the emergence of the notion of
field can be traced back at least to 19th century physics, but it will be not
revisited here (see [8]). We just note that although the concept of particle
1The point, however, is controversial. For perhaps ontology should indeed deal with
what exists independently of how it may be described by us; thus, dealing, as it were, with
what God ordains. In contrast, the ‘ontology of a theory’ — to use Cao’s Quinean words
mentioned earlier — reflects what is posited by a given theory. But, at the fundamental
level, such theory-dependent ontology is, ultimately, all we (can) have.
2For instance, given Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, it may not be possible to mea-
sure the whole quantum state of a quantum object with full certainty.
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had strong defenders in the early formulations of quantum theory (such as
Max Born), the concept of field emerged as the fundamental one. Nowadays,
most physicists seem to accept an ontology of fields (on those occasions when
they think about the issue). However, they do not always express themselves
in this way, and as we noted above, they often speak in terms of particles.3
For our present purposes, two points should be stressed. First, in the
characterization of particles (even as epiphenomena of fields), QFT uses
standard mathematics (and logic). We shall discuss shortly what this ap-
parently innocuous fact entails. Second, the concept of particle that emerges
from this characterization is presupposed by contemporary physicists when
they call certain objects particles. After examining the main features of this
conception of particle, we will analyze the relationship it bears with relevant
mathematical characterizations.
3 The metaphysics of quantum fields
To discuss the metaphysics of quantum fields,4 we begin, as usual, with a
discussion of how a quantum field is constructed.5 Basically, a quantum field
is obtained either by taking a classical field and quantizing it (field quanti-
zation), or by taking an assembly of indistinguishable (and non-interacting)
quantum particles, described by the appropriate wave equation, and quan-
tizing it (second quantization). In the latter case, we need ‘to make’ the
quantum particles indistinguishable. This is the point where symmetry con-
ditions enter.
Usually, the assumption is made that a classical field can be decomposed
into the weighted sum of modes, each with a fixed wavelength. The energy
of the field can then be decomposed so that each mode independently con-
tributes to the field’s total energy, in clear analogy with the case of the simple
harmonic oscillator. For instance, following [18], consider the Klein-Gordon
3Why do physicists do that? Two tentative hypotheses can be mentioned here. Follow-
ing Schro¨dinger, one can note that physicists have brought to quantum mechanics certain
parts of the language of classical physics, based on the ‘old’ notion of particle as an in-
dividual, even though such physicists realize that that language does not mesh with “the
real particle” (for a discussion, see [10, p. 246]). Another possibility is to insist on the
tendency many humans have of dividing the world into objects (individuals) in order to
speak of them (an alternative suggested by Toraldo di Francia [19]). Both are interesting
hypotheses, but this is not the place to pursue them further.
4Further details are given in [10, Chap. 9].
5For a clear account of how to construct field operators for each type of particle, see,
for instance, [16, Chap. 2].
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field, which satisfies the equation of motion:
(∇2 − 1
c2
∂2
∂t2
+ µ2)ψ = 0.
The motion of the field is represented in terms of modes, which corre-
sponds to the quantization of infinite harmonic oscillators. The energy is
given by:
E =
∑
k
ηk(~ωk) + constant,
where ωk is the angular frequency of the mode k and ηk are the eingenvalues
of the number occupation operators Nk = a
†
kak, where the a
†
k and ak are
the raising and lowering operators for the harmonic oscillators [10, Chap.
9]. These excitation numbers ηk are usually identified with the number of
particles in the k-mode with energy ~k associated with that state of the field
[18].
At this stage then the concept of particle enters. And it turns out, as
Redhead [17] notes, that these ‘particles’, at least on a certain interpretation,
do not have intrinsic individuality. In other words, these quanta cannot be
regarded as individuals in the standard sense: for instance, given their lack of
‘intrinsic individuality’, no labels can be attached to them. How did we end
up with ‘particles’ like that? And can a straightforward, standard semantics
for the resulting quantum theory be provided? (As we will see, it is not clear
that the answer to the latter question is positive.) We turn to these issues
now.
4 Working with standard mathematics
Brian Davies points out that formal logic and set theory “are not important
for mathematicians [presumably he refers particularly to applied mathemati-
cians], the great majority of whom have never taken a course in formal logic
and would not be able to write down the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set
theory” [7, p. 113]. In fact, mathematicians typically are not concerned
with foundational issues, and usually do not delve into the (various) formal
systems that have emerged from developments in logic and the foundations
of set theory. But if this is the case for mathematicians, it is even more so
for physicists. Not surprisingly, it is no simple task to convince physicists of
the importance of studying the logical and mathematical basis of physical
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theories.6 Needless to say, this is not our goal here. Rather, we intend only
to highlight some consequences of working with standard mathematics and
logic, and the assumptions that need to be made to circumvent some diffi-
culties that emerge when this framework is used in the context of quantum
mechanics.
The underlying mathematics of the SM is classical mathematics, hence
the SM presupposes classical logic. But physicists use a mixture of various
formalisms (as they call the mathematical theories they use), semi-classical
approximations, and localized wave packets (among other components), in
such a way that the underlying mathematics is not completely clear.7 De-
spite that, we can assume that, from a formal point of view, all the math-
ematical details of the SM can be formulated in a fragment of Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC) [9]. In ZFC, it is possible
to construct, for instance, the theories of complex numbers, derivatives, dif-
ferential equations, Hilbert spaces, and probability measure — and all that
is required of the mathematical apparatus of the SM.
In particular, the underlying logic of ZFC is Leibnizian, that is, it is a
logic of individuals. According to classical logic and mathematics, the iden-
tity relation and, hence, the concept of identity have a specific meaning,
given by the classical theory of identity : if x and y are identical, they cannot
be distinct entities, they are the same object, and count as being just one.
Despite the redundancy and vagueness of this formulation, it expresses well
the intuitive idea articulated by the relevant postulates.8 But sometimes
identity is presented, as in A. Zeilinger’s formulation, by noting that “iden-
tity cannot mean more than this: being the same in all properties” ([21]).
A difficulty then immediately emerges: if quantum ‘identical’ (that is, in-
distinguishable) particles are not the same, how can they share the same
properties without violating classical logic? (We will return to this point
below.)
Perhaps Zeilinger is referring to the way physicists use the word ‘iden-
tity’ in expressions like identical particles. Presumably, they mean agreement
with respect to all intrinsic properties (see [11, p. 275]). But, alas, this is
6Recall the polemic between McKinsey, Sugar and Suppes with Clifford Truesdell and
G. Hamel about the axiomatization of classical particle mechanics (see [20, p. 525]). A
more recent discussion of the foundations of physical theories, including criticisms made
by notorious physicists, can be found in [4].
7Some discussion of the lack of use of a clear mathematical theory in contemporary
foundations of physics is provided in [13].
8It turns out that first-order postulates are not enough to characterize the diagonal of
the domain of interpretation, the set where usually identity is interpreted, namely, the set
∆D := {〈x, x〉 : x ∈ D}, where D is that domain (see [10, §6.3.1]).
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not the conception that underlies classical logic. On this conception, iden-
tity requires agreement with respect to all properties. Thus, the physicist’s
conception is ultimately just indiscernibility relative to intrinsic properties;
that is, it is just a kind of ‘relative identity’. The latter concept can be easily
defined in a classical framework (e.g., in standard higher-order logic).9
But apparently this is not what Zeilinger is stating. He seems to refer
to the (classical) concept of identity, and thus our criticism applies. It is
important to realize that classical logic (with identity) is Leibnizian in the
sense that it keeps some form of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles
(PII). In a second-order language (see the restrictions given in the previous
footnote), this principle can be written as follows: ∀F (F (x) ↔ F (y)) →
x = y. According to this principle, all indiscernible objects are the same
object. The converse of PII, the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals,
namely, x = y → ∀F (F (x) ↔ F (y)), also holds, since if follows from the
substitutive law of identity: it is a theorem of classical second-order logic.
Furthermore, consider the property ‘being identical with a’, which is defined
by Pa(x) := x = a, and suppose that this property is in the range of the
variable F . In this case, even PII is a theorem of second-order logic [10, p.
255].10 This is one of the main motivations to rule out the concept of identity
from the logic of quantum objects and to work with them by supposing only a
weaker relation of indiscernibility [10, Chaps. 7 and 8]. Philosophical reasons
will also be offered below.
How can we accommodate indiscernible objects (such as quantum par-
ticles on a given interpretation) within standard mathematics and logic?
Quantum physics, again on a certain interpretation, deals with indiscernible
particles. Particles that arise from quantum fields — either free fields or
interacting fields — must be indiscernible (assuming, once again, a certain
interpretation). We can call an individual something that obeys the clas-
sical theory of identity mentioned above, that is, it is something identical
only to itself, and to nothing else. Hence, if we have two individuals, they
are distinct — as the converse of PII states. In fact, this way of mak-
ing the point is more in accordance with Leibniz’s own way of speaking:11
9In higher-order logic, such as simple type theory, consider the following predicate I
(for ‘intrinsic’): I(F ) holds if, and only if, F is an intrinsic property. The physicist’s un-
derstanding of identity of particles can then be formulated: x = y := ∀F (I(F ) → (F (x) ↔
F (y))), here the variables x and y range over particles, whereas F ranges over their prop-
erties. Clearly, if we suppose that there are also extrinsic properties, this formulation does
not characterize mathematical identity.
10This can also be done if only a finite number of objects is being considered, which
seems to be the case of physical theories.
11Leibniz often presented his principle in a ‘negative way’, pointing out that if certain
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x 6= y → ∃F (F (x) ∧ ¬F (y)).
In the context of quantum mechanics, the indiscernibility is achieved by
supposing that the wave function satisfies something like:
ψ(x1, . . . , xn) = eiθψ(xσ(1) , . . . , xσ(n)),
here σ is an element of the permutation group of {1, . . . , n}, n is the number
of particles, and θ is a real number (see [3]). In other words, the particles
are named 1, . . . , n, and the situation is such that any permutation of such
indices does not amount to a different physical situation: the particles are
indiscernible. In particular, the point applies to two relevant wave functions:
the symmetric and the anti-symmetric, which correspond, respectively, to
the two basic (detectable) kinds of particles, bosons and fermions. (The
formalism, however, is compatible with a wide range of kinds of particles:
para-particles of several kinds.)12
Even fermions, whose wave function is anti-symmetric, and which, due
to Pauli’s Exclusion Principle, must involve some difference, cannot be re-
garded as legitimate individuals. After all, individuals satisfy a number of
(necessary) conditions — but not all of them are satisfied by fermions. (i)
Individuals belong to a kind. A cube of scrapped metal, despite being made
of the same material as a car, is still a cube and not a car. (It is sometimes
said that a sortal concept should be used here, but problems emerge in the
case of quantum objects; see [10, §8.7].) (ii) Individuals have properties.
These properties may change, but the individual remains the same. (iii)
Individuals have numerical identity. Usually such identity is expressed by a
singular term, a rigid designator (e.g. a proper name or a definite descrip-
tion) in Kripke’s sense. A rigid designator refers to the same individual in
every possible world in which that individual exists. (iv) Individuals can
always be distinguished from others, even of the same kind, which allows
them to receive names, or labels. (v) The latter label the individuals in the
sense that we can always (in principle) recognize the particular individual
by its name (or by a definite description) as being that individual. (A sixth
condition will be introduced shortly.)
objects are not identical, then there must exist some quality (a given property) that
distinguishes them. In Section 9 of his Discourse on Metaphysics, he notes that “it is not
true that two substances can resemble each other completely and differ only in number
[solo numero]”.
12As is well known, the square of the wave function, namely, |ψ(x1, . . . , xn)|2, gives the
relevant probability, and it does not matter whether the wave function is symmetric or
anti-symmetric, for its square it is the same in both cases.
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These conditions entail that, given a certain individual, which thus has
certain properties, it is (in principle) always possible to claim that it is that
individual rather than another. Names and definite descriptions express the
individual’s genidentity, to use Reichenbach’s term (or its trans-temporal
identity, or label-endurance).
Consider now two electrons (which are fermions) of a Helium atom in
the fundamental state. According to quantum physics, the only distinction
between them (which makes Pauli’s Exclusion Principle hold) concerns their
spin: in a given direction, one has spin UP, the other has spin DOWN.
If they were individuals, we could name one of them Peter (say, the one
whose spin is UP) and the other Paul (the one whose spin is DOWN). We
would also be able to recognize, through an experimental procedure, which
is which. However, as is well known, this is not something that can be done.
Nothing in the quantum world determines which electron is Peter and which
is Paul.13 Thus, despite the difference between them, these electrons cannot
be regarded as individuals in the classical sense. But this violates stan-
dard mathematics and logic: since there are two electrons, they are distinct
objects; nonetheless, according to quantum mechanics, they are indistin-
guishable!
The difficulty also emerges if we consider the difference between a certain
chemical compound, such as a molecule of sulfuric acid, H2SO4, and what
we obtain if we replace (assuming that it is possible to do so) one hydrogen
atom in that molecule by ‘another’ atom of the same kind. According to
quantum mechanics, there is no physical difference between the two com-
pounds. But since such compounds have ‘different’ hydrogen atoms, they
are distinct. From the point of view of quantum mechanics, we are dealing
with indistinguishable, but nonetheless different, compounds — a situation
that is in tension with the classical conception of identity.
Consider, as yet another instance of the general difficulty, the process of
ionization of a neutral atom which has just one electron in its outer shell.
We ionize the atom by releasing one electron, obtaining, thus, a negative ion.
(Note that expressions such as ‘the electron’ and ‘one electron’ presuppose
the identity of the objects that are referred to.) By absorbing an electron,
the atom then returns to its neutral state. Two questions immediately arise:
First, what is the physical (rather than the metaphysical) difference between
the two neutral atoms (before and after the electron’s release)? According
13In order ‘to save’ PII, van Fraassen distinguishes quantum dynamical states from
experimental events. As will become clear, this proposal can be accommodated by ours
(see [13] and [22]).
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to quantum mechanics (on a certain interpretation), the answer is clear:
there is no difference whatsoever. Second, is the absorbed electron the same
as the released electron? Once again, the answer is apparent: there is no
fact of the matter here. But in this case, we cannot regard such electrons
as individuals. After all, it is not clear that the concept of identity can
be applied to them. We cannot assert that the two electrons — supposing
that there are two of them — are distinct, given that it is unclear what the
difference is between them. The possibility of giving them names is clearly
not a sufficient condition for individuality. Definite descriptions, such as ‘the
electron which was released from the atom’, presuppose identity; but it is
doubtful that this expression really makes sense in this context.
It now becomes clear that we need to add a sixth condition to our char-
acterization of individuals, namely: (vi) Individuals are ‘extensional ’, in the
sense that at least some of the ‘aggregates’ to which an individual belongs
change when an individual is replaced by another. For example, a football
team formation is no longer the same formation if a player is replaced by
another: it is a distinct team formation. Teams, however, remain the same
despite changes in the players that constitute them. In this respect, ag-
gregates of quanta resemble teams rather than team formations. Quantum
aggregates do have components, but their components can be replaced (by
components of the same type) without changing the aggregates. The H2SO4
molecule, like a team and unlike a team formation, does not change when a
hydrogen atom is replaced by another. It is basically due to this sixth con-
dition that even fermions cannot be regarded as individuals in the standard
(classical) sense. No quantum aggregate to which a fermion belongs changes
when a fermion is replaced by another: the aggregate remains the same.14
What should be done then? One possibility is to restrict the applica-
tion of the concept of individual (which may be taken as primitive) only to
some entities,15 while insisting that the concept of identity holds in general.
Formally, this move can be made by assuming that x = y is a well-formed
formula (and so is its negation), but the predicate ‘is an individual’ only
14Note that although we may not be able to identify explicitly certain objects of classical
mathematics, on a standard interpretation they are individuals. Consider the following
two subsets, (1, 2) and (3, 4), of the set of real numbers, and let us assume the axiom
of choice. Since, with this assumption, the set of real numbers is well ordered, these
subsets have each a least element, which are distinct. We are unable, however, to exhibit
explicitly the well-ordering in question by a formula. Quanta, on the interpretation we
have been invoking here, behave differently: the issue is not whether we are able or not
to distinguish them — they are indistinguishable even in principle.
15For example, in the case of concrete individuals, they are expected to satisfy some
physical conditions, such as presenting decoherence.
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applies to certain objects. In this way, the postulates of identity hold for
those entities that obey the predicate ‘is an individual’, and it is possible to
continue to use standard logic and mathematics.
But this move raises some concerns. First, even if the postulates of
identity apply to individuals, the idea that we can speak of non-individuals
(those who are not individuals) as being equal or different presupposes that
in some way they are discernible. Otherwise, it is unclear what is meant by
x = y (or x 6= y) as applied to such non-individuals. Second, in the context
of quantum mechanics, this alternative resembles the introduction of hid-
den variables — items that go beyond the quantum-mechanical description
and which are supposed to settle certain issues that are left open by quan-
tum theory alone. Presumably, such ‘hidden variables’ would allow one to
distinguish non-individuals. But there are well-known difficulties with the
introduction of such variables in quantum physics (as the Kochen-Specker
theorem indicates). Third, this alternative is not significantly different from
restricting mathematical discourse to a particular ZFC structure in which
just some properties and relations are considered. In this case, it is easy
to define the concept of identity relative to this structure (invariance by its
bundle of relations) by noting that the objects a and b are identical if and
only if they share all the selected properties and relations — or, equivalently,
if there is an automorphism h of the structure such that h(a) = b.16 How-
ever, rather than classical identity, we have here indiscernibility relative to a
structure (or to a bundle of properties and relations). Finally, if the structure
in question is built in ZFC, it can always be extended (by adding adequate
predicates and relations) to a rigid structure, whose only automorphism is
the identity function. In other words, outside the structure, that is, in the
‘whole ZFC’, we can show that any object described in ZFC is an individual.
(This holds for all usual set theories and higher-order logical systems.) The
attempt to ‘confine’ individuals to a particular structure is just a somewhat
artificial way of avoiding reference to certain properties.17
These considerations suggest that van Fraassen’s distinction between
quantum dynamical states and experimental events can be interpreted as
stating that the former represent what a vector or a statistical operator
stands for — that is, things embedded in quantum mechanics, whose evo-
lution is governed by dynamical laws — while events are described only
‘from outside’ the formalism of quantum theory. In particular, PII would
16Incidentally, this is Quine’s way of ‘defining’ identity.
17We are simplifying the discussion here, given that the concepts of distinction by
automorphisms and distinction by a formula are not the same. But we shall not pursue
this point further here.
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be preserved only outside the formalism. That is, while dynamical states
are described within the formalism of quantum mechanics, events are extra-
theoretic entities that satisfy the probability calculus (for further details, see
[13]).
5 Is identity a fundamental concept?
Why is such a strong commitment to identity ultimately needed? Perhaps
Toraldo di Francia is right in suggesting that we have an inclination to
reason and speak about the world as being formed by objects conceived of as
individuals. Classical logic, standard mathematics, and classical mechanics
seem to be reinforced by this tendency. But if, as Zeilinger insists, identity
amounts to being the same with respect to all properties, then perhaps
none of us are individuals, for our properties are constantly changing, and
strictly speaking, we lack a well-defined catalog of properties that identify us.
Leaving aside the old controversy about essential properties and ideas about
substratum, perhaps we can say that, despite their constant changes, our
properties are unique to us. But, clearly, this is a metaphysical supposition.
In the end, Hume was right in noting that the key reason why we are
able to (re-)identify objects over time is habit. In fact, there is no logical
way of proving that the Barack Obama we saw yesterday on TV is the same
we saw the week before, although it is easier to suppose that this is the
case. Ultimately, similarly to inductive inferences, the identity of an object
over time has no logical grounds. This seems to be particularly the case for
electrons and other quantum objects.
On reflection, the notion of identity as applied to empirical objects may
be just a useful tool. It is easy to assume the identity of Barack Obama over
time — as well as of other persons and physical objects. In fact, it is hard
to imagine what the physical world and the theories we construct about it
would be like without such a hypothesis. The latter may be seen as a meta-
physical assumption we impose on our understanding of the world. But this
assumption requires ontological commitments that are strongly questioned
by a reasonable interpretation of quantum physics.
Perhaps one way to proceed, from the point of view of the foundations
of physics, and for those who have a realist inclination, is to wake up from
the classical slumber and apply quantum ideas more generally — including
those involving indiscernibility — to the world as a whole. A difficult task,
no doubt, but a path worth exploring. Interestingly, this path can also be
explored by empiricists, who do not take quantum mechanics as being true,
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or even approximately true (see [22]). In examining the implications of (a
certain interpretation of) quantum mechanics to the (lack of) identity of
ordinary objects, we may be able to understand how the observable world
would be if quantum mechanics were true — no doubt, a valuable task as
well.
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